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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
trespass may start a chain of events which may result in strange
and unusual injuries. A farmer's cow escaped, entered a neigh-
bor's barn, and fell through the floor into a cistern. Later the
neighbor entered the barn and fell through the broken floor
and was seriously injured. No recovery was allowed by the
court on the ground that the injury was not such as would
usually and probably result from the escape and subsequent tres-
pass of defendant's cow. 26
It is submitted that on the basis of the above analysis, the
court reached an appropriate result in the instant case, although
the language used seems to be unduly confusing. The trial court
noted that nine days in which plaintiff could use and observe
the broken steps had elapsed and held that this broke the effect
of the direct invasion. At first blush, nine days seems to be a
long time between the termination of the trespass and the re-
sulting direct consequential injury. However, courts have al-
lowed recovery in cases where the resulting injury occurred
several weeks after the termination of the trespass.27 Apparently,
it was felt that the trial court should not have ruled as a matter
of law on this point without the introduction of further testi-
mony. However, if this was the only exit to plaintiff's home,
and it was not possible to have the steps repaired, then the
knowledge of the danger might not preclude recovery. Since
evidence which would enable the court to consider this and
other factual situations which might exist did not appear in the
record, it seems that the court was not willing to affirm until
these possibilities were explored.
Charley J. Schrader, Jr.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - PSYCHOSIS RESULTING FROM
DAILY ASSEMBLY LINE PRESSURES
Plaintiff brought suit to recover workmen's compensation for
a psychosis resulting from emotional pressures encountered in
daily assembly line work. The defendant denied that a mental
disorder precipitated solely by usual mental stimulus constituted
a compensable disability, due to the lack of any single event
causing plaintiff's breakdown. The referee entered an award
26. Hollenbeck v. Johnson, 79 Hun. 499, 29 N.Y. Supp. 945 (Sup. Ct. 1894).
27. See note 24 aupra.
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of compensation, which was affirmed by the workmen's compen-
sation appeal board. On certiorari to the Michigan Supreme
Court, held, affirmed. A disabling psychosis resulting from pro-
duction line employment is compensable under the Michigan
Workmen's Compensation Act. Carter v. General Motors Corp.,
361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960).
Workmen's compensation is designed to afford compensation
to employees for injuries arising from employment without re-
gard to fault on the part of the employee or employer.' It is
designated to compensate the employee for injuries which he has
in fact received through his employment. The acts of many
states, including Louisiana, require an "accident ' 2 and set forth
guide lines to determine when an injury is in fact attributable to
the employment. The basic and indispensable ingredient of the
statutory term "accident" is unexpectedness. Most jurisdictions
also require that the injury be traceable, within reasonable lim-
its, to a definite time, place, and occasion or cause.8 In the ma-
jority of jurisdictions it is not required that there be an unex-
pected cause; rather an unexpected result from usual or custom-
ary exertion will suffice to constitute a compensable accident. 4
The Louisiana act requires that there be an unexpected or un-
foreseen event,5 and in interpreting the statute the Louisiana
courts are in accord with the majority rule that only the result
need be unexpected. 6
1. Lambert v. Industrial Comm., 411 Ill. 593, 104 N.E.2d 783 (1952) ; Bour-
geois v. J. W. Crawford Constr. Co., 213 La. 992, 36 So.2d 13 (1948).
2. LA. R.S. 23:1021(1) (1950). It should be noted at this point that Michigan
does not have an accident statute.
3. 1 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 37:20 (1952).
4. Id. § 38.00. In the case of J. W. Metz Lumber Co. v. Taylor, 134 Colo. 249,
302 P.2d 521 (1956), the Colorado court explained the accident-result rule in
finding that injuries are designated "accident to distinguish them from inten-
tional injuries and those caused by disease; and that the work itself need not be
extraordinary, as an unexpected and unintended result would constitute an acci-
dent."
5. LA. R.S. 23:1021(1) (1950).
6. See Custer v. Higgins Industries, Inc., 24 So.2d 511, 513 (La. App. 1946),
where it was stated: "The reason why on that day something happened was not
because anything in his work went wrong, but simply because within the man
himself there had taken place a change." Accord, Hill v. J. B. Beaird Corp., 19
So.2d 295 (La. App. 1944) ; Elmore v. Avoyelles Wholesale Groc. Co., 14 So.2d
684 (La. App. 1943) ; Biggs v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 170 So.2d 273 (La.
App. 1936). However, "in some of the cases it is stated that although the dis-
abling event need not be different in kind or intensity from the regular work of
the employee, yet it must appear that the employees' regular work was physically
strenuous in character or that he was regularly required to work in excessive heat.
The reason for this apparent qualification is obvious: The fact that the event need
not be unusual or unexpected does not obviate the fundamental requirement that
the claimant must show a causal relationship between his disability and the condi-
tions 'under which he performed his work." MALONE, LOUISIANA WOaKMxN'S
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As the definite time requirement is usually not satisfied
unless either the cause or result is reasonably limited in time,
there is an area of concern when both the cause and result mani-
fest themselves gradually and no definite time may be pinpoint-
ed for either. A strict interpretation of the rule would seem to
require that recovery be denied due to the inability of the plain-
tiff to prove a definite time of either the cause or result. How-
ever, many courts have indulged in rather fictitious reasoning
in an attempt to escape this problem. For example, Michigan
has reasoned that there is always a "last single shot" or a "last
blast of the hammer" preceding final collapse to which the injury
can be attributed.7 Other courts have reached the same result by
applying the repeated impact theory, whereby each tiny bump, 8
noise,8 or jar 0 is regarded as an accidental occurrence. It ap-
pears that in the last single event and repeated impact cases the
courts are finding that there is a discernible event sufficiently
limited in time so as to satisfy the definite time requirement.
Louisiana attempts to satisfy the time limitation by requiring
that the accident be sudden or violent." But Louisiana also re-
quires violence in the personal injury section of the act.12 De-
spite the alternatives of the accident requirement (sudden or
violent), and the violence required for a personal injury, the
courts have placed the emphasis on the requirement of sudden-
ness and have given little credence to that of violence.' 3 In no
reported case has a Louisiana court refused to classify an event
as an accident solely for the reason that it was unable to find
COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 214 (1951). See also Leonard v. Consoli-
dated Rock, 101 So.2d 736 (La. App. 1958) ; Lampkin v. Kent Piling Co., 34 So.2d
76 (La. App. 1948) ; Siscoe v. Cooley, 9 So.2d 313 (La. App. 1942).
7. Sheppard v. Michigan National Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 83 N.W.2d 614 (1957).
8. Aldrich v. Dole, 43 Idaho 30, 249 Pac. 87 (1926) (injury from successive
impacts on knee of defective shift lever).
9. Winkelman v. Boeing Airplane Co., 166 Kan. 503, 203 P.2d 171 (1949)
(loss of hearing due to repeated loud noises of gunfire in target range).
10. American Maize Products Co. v. Nichiporchik, 108 Ind. App. 502, 29
N.E.2d 801 (1940) (injury attributed to several years of jarring of hands during
use of air hammer).
11. LA. R.S. 23:1021(1) (1950).
12. Id. 23:1021(7).
13. See MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE§ 213 (1951). As the Louisiana statute is written in the disjunctive (suddenly or
violently), the presence of either of these elements would seem to satisfy' the
statute. However, Louisiana also requires that there be a personal injury, with
a personal injury 'being defined as including "only injuries by violence to the
physical structure of the body." LA. R.S. 23:1021(7) (1950). From combining
these two requirements it would appear that in order to obtain compensation
violence must always be present, but suddenness need not ever actually be a con-
sideration. Yet, the jurisprudence fails to support this idea. The Louisiana courts
have read the accident statute and personal injury statute as one, and have given
the weight of importance to the requirement of suddenness.
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that it happened violently.14 The suddenness requirement is
deemed satisfied even though the injury developed over a long
period of time in cases where a strain 5 or impact 6 has been in-
volved. Otherwise, recovery has been denied by labeling the dis-
ability which slowly develops as an occupational disease.
1 7
The Michigan Compensation Act requires that a personal
injury arise out of and in the course of the employment, and does
not require an accident.' In the instant case the court rejected
the argument that there need be a single event before the injury
is compensable. It reasoned that it was not necessary to find a
direct physical injury nor a single event or shock, but that an
injury precipitated solely by a prolonged mental stimulus is
compensable- the causal connection being proved.19 In actual-
ity, it appears the court was rejecting a doctrinaire definite time
consideration, even though it spoke in terms of single events.
The question arises whether Louisiana would allow compen-
sation in a situation such as the instant one, since under Louisi-
ana law an injury is not compensable unless it results from an
accident. There should be little difficulty with the unexpected-
ness requirement as Louisiana follows the accident-result rule,
requiring that only the result need be unexpected. However, it
appears that compensation would probably be denied due to the
court's interpretation of the requirements of an accident and a
personal injury. The jurisprudence seems well established that
14. See MMONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE
1213 (1951).
15. See York v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 37 So.2d 68 (La. App. 1948),
where the court failed to discus the fact that the cause of the injury was one of
prolonged duration, and therefore did not go into the problems which are usually
presented in such a situation.
16. Stokes v. Miller, 150 So.2d 509 (La. App. 1957) ; Harris v. Southern
Carbon Co., 162 So. 430 (La. App. 1935).
17. The Louisiana courts usually find that if an injury arises gradually, it is
not an accident but an occupational disease. Cannella v. Gulf Refining Co., 154
So. 406, 409 (La. App. 1934). However, in one case of repeated impact, the court
applied a new standard to the concept of occupational diseases. In Harris v.
Southern Carbon Co., 162 So. 430 (La. App. 1935), an occupational disease was
defined as one "which is not only incident to an occupation, but the natural, usual,
and ordinary result thereof." In 1952, LA. R.S. 23:1031.1, which authorizes com-
pensation for certain designated occupational diseases was added to the Louisiana
Workmen's Compensation Act. However, that section has no effect on the partic-
ular injury in the instant situation as it is not one of those enumerated.
18. MICH. STAT. ANN. 17:151 (1960).
19. Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 113, 106 N.W.2d 105, 118
(1960) : "The case at bar involves a series of mental stimuli or events [the pres-
sure of his job and the pressure of his foreman] which caused an injury or dis-
ability under the act, causal connection in fact having been found by the board,
supported by competent evidence."
NOTES'1961"1
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only in strain and impact cases will the court allow recovery
where both the cause and result are of prolonged duration.20
However, it seems that compensation could be allowed in the
instant case by applying another interpretation to the Louisiana
act. It is submitted that this could be accomplished by the courts'
reading the accident (sudden or violent) requirement in the dis-
junctive, giving the proper emphasis to that of violence, and by
applying the "violence as to effect doctrine." 21
Walter M. Hunter, Jr.
20. See notes 15 and 16 supra.
21. In the case of Johnson v. Zurich General Ace. and Liability Ins. Co., 161
So. 667, 668 (La. App. 1935), the court allowed recovery, finding that the plain-
tiff "suffered a sudden and violent shock to his heart." If this interpretation is
followed, it appears that the violence requirement may be satisfied if the injury
manifests itself in a violent manner or if the effect upon the body is violent.
Book Notes
LE DRorr FRANCAIS: VOL. 1, LES DONNPES FONDAMENTALES DU
DROIT FRANgAIS; VOL. 2, PRINCIPES ET TENDANCES DU DROIT
FaANgAIS, by Ren David. Paris, Librairie G~n6rale de Droit
et de Jurisprudence, 1960. Pp. 214; 597.
These two books constitute volumes 11 and 12 of the Con-
temporary Legal Systems sponsored and put out by the Com-
parative Law Institute of the University of Paris. The first is
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